INWARD AIRPOWER: CIVIL-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIR FORCE SECURITY COOPERATION
This paper examines potential civil-military implications for U.S. Air Force security cooperation activities in building partnership capacity (BPC) with airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Specifically, this paper examines how proliferation of airborne ISR capabilities has the potential to undermine efforts to build and strengthen democratic governments. The potential unintended consequences and second or third-order effects of ISR proliferation present a dilemma to statesmen and strategists, wherein near-term security gains may undermine longterm democratization. Global proliferation of ISR technologies further complicates this dilemma, because should the United States choose not to export these technologies to a given country, suppliers from other nations will. This leaves decision makers seeking the least-worst solution, and requires commitment to address governance development at high levels within state-to-state relationships.
As the U.S. seeks to build partner nation counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities, the success of ISR integrated with ground forces is a key lesson to carry forward. Airborne ISR assets have made vital contributions to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and will remain essential to U.S., coalition and partner efforts in future counterinsurgency or security operations seeking to gain control over ungoverned spaces. Although U.S. and coalition operations have ended in Iraq, and as Afghans move toward assuming responsibility for their own security, the uncertainty of the global environment will continue to pose challenges of weak and failing states, ungoverned territory, insurgency movements, and global terrorist organizations. Persistent ISR greatly facilities conduct of these operations in these environments. However, U.S. ISR capabilities and/or capacity are likely to be constrained in future defense budgets, and enabling allies and partners to meet their own security requirements will be essential to both promoting international stability and pursuing U.S. interests.
As this paper discusses the merits of ISR during recent and future operations, it focuses on considerations that may be relevant when exporting ISR capabilities. In addition, this paper discusses how intelligence operations may be conducted by a variety of military and civil means and how building robust ISR capabilities in partner nations may present numerous paradoxes. At the broadest level, ISR capabilities oriented toward internal defense may undermine the development or maturity of fledgling democracies. In addition, ISR may allow partner nations to infringe on their citizens' human or civil rights. Despite these concerns, the rapid development of surveillance technology by international corporations and other nations will likely proliferate capabilities beyond where U.S. policy can affect.
Regarding methodology, this paper considers political and military theory, history of the United States intelligence community, United States and international policy regarding human rights, and ongoing debate regarding technology, privacy, and civil rights. The latter provides diverse and emerging viewpoints, and consequently this paper provides only a mere snapshot of the current debate that will likely continue well after publication. Regarding terminology, for the purposes of this paper, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) are considered synonymous.
Similarly, 'airborne ISR' includes both manned and unmanned platforms. In addition, while many airborne ISR assets are armed, this paper addresses only intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and does not address kinetic missions such as armed overwatch, close air support, etc.
Regarding readers' expectations, this paper does not develop a succinct methodology or framework to facilitate decisions whether or not to export U.S.
technology or determine civil-military cause and effect relationships. Rather, it merely illustrates the complexity of the issue in broad terms. Specific decisions must be in the context of individual partner states, regional considerations, and United States interests.
ISR and Ungoverned Spaces
From the earliest days of manned flight, aircraft have exploited the high ground, In 1998, a series of Washington Post articles sparked scrutiny of the JCET program. 29 The policy-level critique of the JCET program argued that SOF and combatant commander exercises were not synchronized with national policy and not overseen properly within the interagency, although JCETs were "in fact planned with the U.S. Ambassador and the embassy staff country team's knowledge." 30 The reports also alleged that partner nation forces trained by U.S. SOF teams subsequently committed human rights abuses, which created a more vigorous response than did the issue of policy disconnects.
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At one end of the spectrum, "JCETs may be viewed by some as directly undermining U.S. efforts to promote democracy, demilitarization, and respect for human rights." 32 Although SOF units began conducting human rights training as part of the JCET curriculum, sovereign partner-nation decisions remained beyond U.S. control. Unfortunately, application of the Leahy Amendment can be problematic, as can be assessment of its effectiveness. Since individuals are vetted for previous human rights abuses, it is feasible that foreign units may exclude specific personnel in order to qualify for training, only to return those individuals to the unit after the JCET exercise.
More importantly, individuals' previous good behavior may not be an accurate predictor of future behavior. While human rights training seeks to positively influence organizations as well as individuals, group dynamics and local politics may drive undesired behavior despite previous training. To complicate matters further, since personal oversight ends when SOF units leave, partner nations make independent decisions during future operations. That said, foregoing JCET exercises due to political uncertainties may forfeit access and influence in a country with limited U.S. presence, as well as undermine U.S. SOF training. 39 As discussed later in this paper, addressing human rights throughout all levels of the partner nation government and military forces provides a more systematic approach to influence policy and actions beyond training at the tactical level.
Privacy and Technology Export
While the Leahy Amendment addressed human rights violations, the civil-mil ramifications of building partnership capacity for ISR may range closer to civil rights.
The distinction between civil and human rights may receive different scrutiny, since civil rights violations may seem more benign than the violence typically associated with human rights violations. Nonetheless, civil liberties and privacy may affect democratization. The 2011 National Security Strategy states, "Protecting civil liberties and privacy are integral to the vibrancy of our democracy and the exercise of freedom.
We are balancing our solemn commitments to these virtues with the mandate to provide security to the American people." 40 Within the international community, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights states, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence…" 41 The tension between liberty and security is not a new concern, and was highlighted by our founding fathers. The point here is that these are civilian technologies, used for corporate and lawenforcement purposes. Similarly, despite the technological advancement and innovation within U.S. industry, we are merely one competitor in a global marketplace.
As the U.S. seeks to refine technology export and international political influence, it is important to note that current debates notwithstanding, the United States' record of domestic surveillance and civil liberties is not unblemished.
Intelligence Oversight
The process…" 64 The period also demonstrates a shift in the congressional mindset.
"Oversight began as a punishment for misdeeds; it evolved into an accept(ed) support and necessary evaluation of intelligence operations." 65 Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the USA Patriot Act "gives sweeping new powers to both domestic law enforcement and international intelligence agencies and eliminated the checks and balances that previously gave courts the opportunity to ensure that such powers are not abused." 66 In addition, "it is important to note, that while the USA PATRIOT Act increases police power to conduct domestic surveillance, it does not change the role of the military or the foreign intelligence bodies in relation to domestic intelligence gathering." 67 The purpose of the preceding discussion is not to provide a comprehensive history of intelligence oversight. The purpose is to illustrate the broad grey areas and highlight points from internal debates within the U.S. Government and population. It is important to note, however, that these debates have occurred, and are occurring, within the world's strongest and most mature democracy. Given U.S. Government checks and balances, and foundation that debate provides for our development of policy and law, it may be appropriate to temper expectations regarding how a partner nation may reach their own conclusions. A new or weak democracy may not have the capacity for similar levels of debate and transparency. Likewise, a failing state may be too embroiled in crisis and may lack the institutions to make decisions methodically. Nonetheless, global terrorism and sanctuaries provided by ungoverned spaces present a time-sensitive problem, wherein an actionable solution must be timely and correct.
Considerations for Building Partnership Capacity
The following is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of security assistance or building partnership capacity. Rather, this section will discuss a few basic considerations and concepts, then tie the considerations for ISR export to the broader U.S. objective of democratization.
While airpower alone cannot control territory, airborne ISR assets are a key enabler for monitoring and securing ungoverned spaces. Likewise, while airborne ISR assets may be armed, when used within a state's own territory, they are arguably defensively oriented. This section seeks to mitigate these two unfavorable characteristics within Dolman's framework for military organization to positively influence democratization. however, the issue of developing and utilizing airpower for internal defense is best addressed with the host nation government rather than tactical forces. Similarly, building partnership capacity for entire intelligence organizations that employ ISR assets warrants whole-of-government effort.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states:
As we place greater emphasis on building the capacity of our partners, our efforts will continue to be informed by our long-term determination to foster human dignity. This commitment is manifested in human rights vetting and other controls that shape our efforts to train, equip, and assist foreign forces and partner security institutions. America's efforts to build the capacity of our partners will always be defined by support for healthy civilmilitary relations, respect for human dignity and the rule of law, promotion of international humanitarian law, and the professionalization of partner military forces. efforts to restrain proliferation, as current forecasts predict the worldwide UAV market will grow from $5.9 billion in 2011 to $11.3 billion in 2020. 86 In addition, international firms produce and export 11 major UAV systems, while over 40 countries are developing UAVs. 87 Finally, states will also develop their own manned capabilities, such as the South African Advanced High-Performance Reconnaissance and Surveillance Aircraft (AHRLAC), which unlike other ISR programs that modify civilian aircraft for military use, is specifically designed for ISR, armed patrol, and light attack. U.S. personnel working at the tactical level must set the example of professionalism, and explicitly address protection of civil and human rights. However, it may not be realistic to expect beliefs and behavior to trickle up from the squad or squadron level to the highest levels within the partner nation government. Employing a whole of government approach to develop partner nation policy, oversight programs, and tactical capabilities simultaneously will facilitate balanced growth of partnership capacity at all levels of governance and armed forces. Similarly, developing and sharing strategies for use of ISR assets will maximize the effectiveness and efficiencies of host nation operations. While many discussions will focus on technology and tactics, a broader ends-ways-means strategic assessment will guard against throwing technological means at a problem without understanding the ways that technology will achieve the desired ends. Ceding the state-to-state relationship leaves the U.S. with few mechanisms to influence and develop a foreign nation's policy while it works to build tactical capacity.
The U.S. should certainly not turn a blind eye toward civil or human rights violations.
Likewise, as partner nations struggle to reform their governance and military forces, the U.S. will need to be both patient and persistent. 4 Ibid., 434. 17 Excerpts from Obama, National Security Strategy: "Pursue Sustainable and Responsible Security Systems in At-Risk States: Proactively investing in stronger societies and human welfare is far more effective and efficient than responding after state collapse. The United States must improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law. We will also continue to strengthen the administrative and oversight capability of civilian security sector institutions, and the effectiveness of criminal justice," 27; "Intelligence: Our country's safety and prosperity depend on the quality of the intelligence we collect and the analysis we produce, our ability to evaluate and share this information in a timely manner, and our ability to counter intelligence threats. This is as true for the strategic intelligence that informs executive decisions as it is for intelligence support to homeland security, state, local, and tribal governments, our troops, and critical national missions. We are working to better integrate the Intelligence Community, while also enhancing the capabilities of our Intelligence Community members. We are strengthening our partnerships with foreign intelligence services and sustaining strong ties with our close allies. And we continue to invest in the men and women of the Intelligence Community." [15] [16] . 18 
